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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
this seems to go to great length in imposing liability on the state, still, it is
within the spirit of the act,' 2 and the result does not stand alone in uniqueness. 13

The expansion of governmental activities and the every-day contact a
citizen is required to have with these activities creates a need for legislation
with results comparable to that reached in the instant case. The State of
New York has provided for that need, and in so doing has set an example
that may well be followed by other states.

TRUSTS -

ANNUITIES

-

ANNUITANTS' CLAIM

FOR PRINCIPAL SUM
A testator bequeathed annuities to named non-profit corporations for
the benefit of his nieces for their lives. The annuitants claimed the right
to take the principal sum bequeathed rather than the annuities. Held, that
the annuitants cannot take the principal sum since the named corporations
have a clear interest in the bequests of which they cannot be deprived by
being compelled to turn over the entire fund to the annuitants. Gilbert v.
Findlay College, 74 A.2d 36 (Md. 1950).
English courts, since 1797, have followed the rule that where an absolute annuity is given in a will, the annuitant has the right to elect to take
the principal sum bequeathed for purchase of the annuity, in lieu of the
annuity.' The courts reason-that enforcement of the purchase of the
annuity would be nugatory and vain since the annuitant could sell the
annuity the minute after it was purchased. In early American cases on this
subject, the courts of Massachusetts and New York3 adopted the English
reasoning and applied their rule. Despite a testator's direction to the contrary, the rule was applied and the annuitant was given the right of election
12. See Jackson v. State, 261 N.Y. 134, 138, 184 N.E. 735, 736 (1933) (in which
the court said, "The statute constitutes a recognition and acknowledgment of a moral duty
demanded by the principles of equity and justice.").
13. Metildi v. State, supra note 9 (failure of building inspector to warn workmen of
dangerous condition of building being demolished was negligence sufficient to state a cause
of action); Kittle v. State, 345 App. Div. 401, 284 N.Y. Supp. 657 (3d Dep't 1935),
4ff'd, 272 N.Y. 420, 2 N.E.Zd 850 (1936) (failure to warn invitee of danger in state park,

or to erect guard rails constituted negligence creating liability against state); Tortora v.
State, 244 App. Div. 861, 279 N.Y. Supp. 794 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 269 N.Y. 167, 199 N.E.
44 (1935)(having undertaken to furnish prisoners with heated shelter, state was liable for
injury caused by negligent operation of stove).
1. Barnes v. Rowley, 3 Ves. Jr. 305, 30 Eng. Rep. 1024 (1797); Bailey v. Bishop,
9 Ves. Jr. 6, 32 Eng. Rep. 501 (1803); Palmer v. Crawford, 3 Swan 483, 36 Eng. Rep.
945 (1819); Dawson v. Hearn, I Russ. & M. 606, 39 Eng. Rep. 232 (1831); Ford v.
Batley, 17 Beav. 303, 23 L.J.Ch. 225, 51 Eng. Rep. 1051 (1860); Re Mabbett, Pittman
v. Holborrow, 1 Ch. 707 (1891).
2. Parker v. Cobe, 208 Mass. 260, 94 N.E. 476, (1911).
3. In re Cole's Estate, 219 N.Y. 435, 114 N.E. 785 (1916); Reid v. Brown, 54
Misc. 481, 106 N.Y. Supp. 27 (Surr. Ct. 1907).

CASES NOTED
if the annuity was absolute;4 but, if there was a conditional limitation,5
a gift-over or a remainder,7 it would not apply.
The English rule has been recognized 8 to be in opposition to the generally well established view of the American courts permitting the testator's
intent to govern in the disposition of his property.9 New York adopted the
English rule to conform with the American view by enacting laws which
prohibit the annuitant from electing to take the principal sum unless the
testator expressly provides for such right.' 6 Other states have accomplished
the same thing by judicial decisions, thus making great inroads on the
English rule."
The testator's direct bequest of the annuities to the named corporations
in the principal case distinguishes it from a similar case directing the purchase of annuities from named missionary societies,' 2 as well as from prev4
ious cases in which the testator has directed the trustees,', administrators,
or executors' to purchase annuities. This direct bequest to the named corporations indicates that the testator intended these institutions to have the
benefit of anything which remained of the principal at the death of the
annuitant, The annuitant's right of election is defeated and the testator's
intention is carried out by ruling that the corporations named in the will
have a vested interest in the annuities. Placing this case within the established exception to the English rule,'" since the annuity is not absolute, distinguishes it from those instances where the intention of the testator is
4. In re Bertuch's Will, 225 App. Div. 773, 232 N.Y. Snpp. 36 (2d Dep't 1928);
29 CoL. L. REv. 370 (1927); Stokes v. Cheek, 28 Beav. 620, 54 Eng. Rep. 504 (1860);
Roper v. Roper, 3 Ch.D. 714 (1876). Contra: Berry v. Bank of Manhattan Co., 133
N.J. Eq. 164, 31 A.2d 203 (Ch. 1943).
5.In re Benziger's Estate, 61 Cal.App.2d 628, 143 P.2d 717 (1943); Hatton v.
May, 3 Ch.D. 148 (1876); Gratrix v. Chambers, 2 Gift. 321, 66 Eng. Rep. 134 (1860).
6. See Roper v. Roper, supra note 4, at 721.
7. Re Groves Trusts, 1 Gifl. 74, 65 Eng. Rep. 831 (1859).
8. See Comment, 41 Micn. L. REv. 276 (1942).
9. E.g., Chaflin v. Chaflin, 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889) (leading case);
Pearce v. Pearce, 199 Ala. 491, 74 So. 952 (1917); In re Yatcs' Estate, 170 Cal. 254,
149 Pac. 555 (1915); Jacobson v. Mankato Loan & Trust Co., 191 Minn. 143, 253

N.W. 365 (1934).

10. N.Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAws § 47-6.
11. See Berry v. Bank of Manhattan Co., supra note 4; In re Genziger's Estate,
supra note 5; Feiler v. Klein, 74 N.E.2d 384 (Ohio App. 1947), 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV.
352 (1948); Bedell v. Colby, 94 N.H. 384, 54 A.2d 161 (1947); In re Johnson's Estate,
238 Iowa 1221, 30 N.W.2d 164 (1947).
12. In re Geis Estate, 167 Misc. 357, 3 N.Y.S.2d 770 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
13. See Feiler v. Klein, supra note 11; In re Fischer's Estate, 261 App. Div. 252,
25 N.Y.S.2d 140 (1st Dep't 1941).
14. See In re Albeser's Will, 32 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Surr. Ct. 1938); Barnes v. Rowley,
supra note 1.
15. See Parker v. Cobe, supra note 2; In re Cole's Estate, supra note 3; In re Bertuch's Will, supra note 4; In re Goodman's Will, 64 N.Y.S.2d 76 (Surr. Ct. 1946).
16. 28 HIALSBURY's LAws or ENGLAND, § 348 (2d ed. 1938) (The established exception is if there is a gift-over then the rule will not be applied).
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carried out in cases of absolute annuities,
be unreasonable to do so.

7

even though at times it would

18

In annuity cases of this type the courts have usually dismissed the
problem by citing the American authority " and granting the annuitant the
right of election. 1his case, however, although not attacking the right of
election in a direct manner, circumvents it by placing it within the established exception 0 and thus weakens its effectiveness. In so doing, the
court evidences the current trend of carrying out the testator's intent, when
it can be determined, in cases where annuitants seek the right of an election, contrary to that intent, under the English rule.
TRUSTS -

JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ACCOUNTS
INDISPENSABLE PARTIES

-

Upon the death of one of two co-trustees, an action was brought for
judicial settlement of accounts. The trust company, sole plaintiff and
executor of the deceased trustee's estate, named as defendants only the
beneficiaries of the trust and itself. An executor's claim by the trust company for trustee's commissions was disallowed. The beneficiaries of the
deceased trustee's estate moved for an order to vacate final judgment. Held,
motion denied. The beneficiaries of a deceased trustee's estate, who are not
beneficiaries of the trust itself, are not indispensable parties to an action
for judicial settlement of accounts. United States Trust Co. of N.Y. v.
Bingham, 92 N.E.2d 39 (N.Y. 1950).
The relationship of a trustee to the cestui que trust is that of a fiduciary.

It is the duty of the trustee to protect the trust not only from the claims
of third parties, but also as to the claims of co-trustees.' Similarly, an executor is held to the same high level of conduct in the discharge of his
duties. Executors have a duty to assert all claims in favor of the estate.2
However, there is nothing in the office or obligations of executors that
precludes them from acting as trustees upon other trusts and for other beneficiaries, if the transaction is not inconsistent with the duties which they
owe as trustee.8 However, beyond any intrinsic conflict of duties, there are
procedural safeguards accorded to the beneficiaries of the different estates
when one, in one capacity, sues or joins himself in another capacity.
17. Feiler v. Klein, supra note 11; Bedell v. Colby, supra note 11; In re Johnson's
Estate, sura note 11.
18. Berry v. Bank of Manhattan Co., supra note 4.
19. Parker v. Cobe, supra note 2; In re Cole's Estate, supra note 5.
20. See note 16 supra.
1. Earle v. Earle, 93 N.Y. 104 (1883); see In re Bun's Estate, 143 Misc. 877, 879,
257 N.Y. Supp. 654, 656 (Sun. Ct. 1932); c. Matter of Cozzen's Estate, 2 Con. 622,
15 N.Y. Supp. 771 (Surf. Ct. 1891); RESTATEMENT, TRaSTS §§ 178, 184 (1935).
2. In re Kohler, 231 N.Y. 353, 132 N.E. 114 (1921).
3. Barry v. Lambert, 98 N.Y. 300 (1885).

